Masculinity and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations

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Abstract

This article explores the intimate historical and modern connection between manhood and nationhood: through the construction of patriotic manhood and exalted motherhood as icons of nationalist ideology; through the designation of gendered ‘places’ for men and women in national politics; through the domination of masculine interests and ideology in nationalist movements; through the interplay between masculine microcultures and nationalist ideology; through sexualized militarism including the construction of simultaneously over-sexed and under-sexed ‘enemy’ men (rapists and wimps) and promiscuous ‘enemy’ women (sluts and whores). Three ‘puzzles’ are partially solved by exposing the connection between masculinity and nationalism: why are many men so desperate to defend masculine, monoracial, and heterosexual institutional preserves, such as military organizations and academies; why do men go to war; and the ‘gender gap’, that is, why do men and women appear to have very different goals and agendas for the ‘nation?’

Keywords: Gender; nationalism; ethnicity; masculinity; sexuality; military; race.

Introduction: political man

‘Political Man’. In the light of a quarter century of ‘second wave’ of feminist scholarship, the title of Seymour Martin Lipset’s classic treatise on politics seems almost quaint in its masculinist exclusiveness. The same can be said for Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel or for the ungendered, presumptively male discourse of T.H. Marshall’s Class, Citizenship, and Social Development or Karl Deutsch’s Nationalism and Social Communication or Barrington Moore’s The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy or Samuel N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan’s Building States and Nations or Perry Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State. Even Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions is a tale of one gender: men and the making of modern France, Russia, and China.
What were the titles and content of these classics of political science and sociology trying to tell us about the structure and operation of citizenship, states, nations, revolutions, empires? Feminist theorists have argued that this absence of women from the work and thinking of these authors reflects, at best, their gender blindness or, at worst, their gender chauvinism. They argue that the result of this gender exclusion has been to render invisible women’s hands in the making of nations and states. The feminist scholarly response to this omission has been twofold: first, to illuminate the role of women in politics by chronicling their participation and leadership in national and opposition politics and movements; second, to uncover and document the mechanisms of women’s exclusion from political organizations, movements, decision-making institutions and processes.

While I shall review some of these efforts to ‘bring the women back in’ to the study of nationalism and national politics, I should note that this necessary and important scholarship has often involved a conflation of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’. That is, the critique of classical literature on the nation and state as ‘gender-blind’ has resulted in an almost exclusive focus on women — women revolutionists, women leaders, women’s hidden labour, women’s exploitation, women’s resistance to domination. While this emphasis on women by gender scholars has begun to fill a critical gap in the study of nationalism and national politics, there remains an important uncharted territory to be investigated.

My primary concern here is on another significant and interesting question, what is the ‘real’ meaning of the masculine focus of social and political analyses of modern states catalogued above? Is it possible that, inadvertently or not, these guys (and gals) were on to something in their preoccupation with men? That is, perhaps the projects described in these titles — state power, citizenship, nationalism, militarism, revolution, political violence, dictatorship, and democracy — are all best understood as masculinist projects, involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities (see Pateman 1989; Connell 1995).

This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the making and unmaking of states: as citizens, as members of the nation, as activists, as leaders. It is to say that the scripts in which these roles are embedded are written primarily by men, for men, and about men, and that women are, by design, supporting actors whose roles reflect masculinist notions of femininity and of women’s proper ‘place’. If nations and states are indeed gendered institutions as much recent scholarship asserts, then to limit the examination of gender in politics to an investigation of women only, misses a major, perhaps the major way in which gender shapes politics — through men and their interests, their notions of manliness, and masculine micro and macro cultures.

In her study of gender, race and sexuality in colonialism, Imperial Leather, McClintock (1995) notes the ‘gendered discourse’ of nationalism,
commenting that ‘if male theorists are typically indifferent to the gendering of nations, feminist analyses of nationalism have been lamentably few and far between. White feminists, in particular, have been slow to recognize nationalism as a feminist issue’ (pp. 356–57). And when feminist scholars do set about to even the gender score, Messerschmidt (1993) argues, in his analysis of _Masculinities and Crime_, the gender lens appears to focus exclusively on women. The resulting scholarship, while more gender balanced in its coverage, still fails to examine systematically what is uniquely masculine in a structural, cultural or social sense, about such clearly gendered activities and institutions as crime, nationalism, politics, or violence, among others.

I argue that nationalist politics is a masculinist enterprise not to indict men for dominating national or international arenas, though they surely do. Nor do I intend to ignore further the contributions of women, though they have been limited by historical gender restrictions. Rather, my goal is to explore the fact of men’s domination of the nation-state in order to see what insights this acknowledgment of masculinity provides us in understanding contemporary national and global politics.

**Constructing men and nations**

In her evocative book, _Bananas, Beaches, and Bases_, Cynthia Enloe (1990, p. 45) observes that ‘nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope’. She argues that women are relegated to minor, often symbolic, roles in nationalist movements and conflicts, either as icons of nationhood, to be elevated and defended, or as the booty or spoils of war, to be denigrated and disgraced. In either case, the real actors are men who are defending their freedom, their honour, their homeland and their women. Enloe’s insight about the connection between manhood and nationhood raises definitional questions about each: what do we mean by ‘masculinity,’ and what do we mean by ‘nationalism?’

**Masculinity**

Recent historical studies of the United States argue that contemporary patterns of US middle-class masculinity arose out of a renaissance of manliness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholars document a resurgent preoccupation with masculine ideals of physique and behaviour around the turn of the century which became institutionalized into such organizations and institutions as the modern Olympic movement which began in 1896 (MacAlloon 1981; 1984), Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Rough Riders’ unit which fought in the Spanish American War in 1898 (Morris 1979; Rotundo 1993), a variety of boys’ and men’s lodges and fraternal organizations, such as the Knights of
Columbus and the Improved Order of Red Men, which were established or expanded in the late nineteenth century (Preuss 1924; Kauffman 1982; Carnes 1989, 1990; Rotundo 1993; Orr 1994; Bederman 1995), and the Boy Scouts of America which were founded in 1910 two years after the publication of R.S.S. Baden-Powell’s influential *Scouting for Boys* (Warren 1986, 1987; MacKenzie 1987).

These organizations embodied US and European male codes of honour (Nye 1993) which stressed a number of ‘manly virtues’ described by Mosse (1996) as ‘normative masculinity’, which included willpower, honour, courage, discipline, competitiveness, quiet strength, stoicism, sang-froid, persistence, adventurousness, independence, sexual virility tempered with restraint, and dignity, and which reflected masculine ideals as liberty, equality, and fraternity (Bederman 1995; Mosse 1996). Borrowing from Rosenberg’s (1980) analysis of ‘Sexuality, Class, and Role’, Rotundo (1987) divided these characteristics among three late nineteenth-century ‘ideals of manhood’ in the middle-class northern US: the ‘Masculine Achiever’ (competitiveness, independence, persistence), the ‘Christian Gentleman’ (willpower, restraint, discipline), and the ‘Masculine Primitive’ (strength, virility, courage).

Of course, the value of and adherence to these normative manly traits vary by time and place. While the writers cited above were describing late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States and Europe, there are other scholarly efforts to define masculinity in more universal terms. Gilmore’s research on cross-cultural conceptions of masculinity, *Manhood in the Making* (1990) shows that there is no universal standard of masculinity. None the less Gilmore argues that although there may be no “Universal Male”, we may perhaps speak of a “Ubiquitous Male” based on these criteria of performance: . . . to be a man . . . one must impregnate women, protect dependents [sic] from danger, and provision kith and kin . . . We might call this quasi-global personage something like “Man-the-Impregnator-Protector-Provider” (p. 223).

Such catalogues of masculine ideals as the historical and cross-cultural undertakings listed above are examples of what Robert Connell (1995, p. 68) calls ‘essentialist’ definitions of masculinity: ‘definitions [that] pick a feature that defines the core of the masculine’. The weakness of the essentialist approach is its arbitrariness and easy falsifiability. Connell (1995, pp. 68–71) catalogues three other definitional strategies besides essentialist: positivist, normative, semiotic. Positivist definitions of masculinity are descriptions of men in a particular place at a particular time: ethnographies of manhood. They are limited by a lack of generalizability, inevitable researcher bias, and tautology. Men are what men do, thus it is impossible for men to behave in feminine ways or for women to
behave in masculine ways (Connell 1995, p. 69). Normative definitions of masculinity emphasize manly ideals, ‘blueprints’, or sex role stereotypes. They are limited by their cultural, historical and value assumptions, and by their emphasis on ideal types which exclude many men, that is, many (most) men do not behave according to a ‘John Wayne’ model of manhood (Connell 1995, p. 70). And finally, semiotic definitions of masculinity contrast masculine and feminine and deduce from the difference the meaning of masculinity (and femininity): ‘The phallus is master-signifier, and femininity is symbolically defined by lack’ (Connell 1995, p. 70). Semiotic definitions are limited by their emphases on discourse and symbolism which tend to overlook the material and structural dimensions of the social constitution of gender meanings.

In a manner that combines several of these definitional approaches, some researchers attempt to articulate the meaning of manhood in negative terms — what men are not. These definitions include a separation from and repudiation of femininity: being a man is not being a woman, and no man would ever want to be a woman (Freud 1923; Chodorow 1978; Adams 1990); a distancing from masculine ‘countertypes’, whether racial — being a (white)man is not being a ‘Jew’ (Green 1993, pp. 101–13; Mosse 1996, pp. 60ff) or an ‘Asian’ (Espiritu 1996, ch. 5), or a ‘Bengali’ (Sinha 1995), or an ‘Indian’ or a ‘black’ (Bederman 1995, p. 181), or sexual — being a man is not acting ‘feminine’ and/or not being a homosexual (Mosse 1985, 1996; Duroche 1991; Donaldson 1993). These racial and sexual masculine ‘countertypes’ are examples of what Connell (1987, p. 186) calls ‘subordinated’ forms of masculinity.

Other negative, albeit somewhat essentialist, definitions of masculinity reflect a distaste for the demands of normative masculinity. In ‘Being a Man’, Paul Theroux (1985, p. 309) complains that, ‘the expression “Be a Man!” strikes me as insulting and abusive. It means: Be stupid, be unfeeling, obedient, soldierly and stop thinking’. Gerzon (1982, p. 5) defines normative manliness as an impossible achievement: ‘In comparing themselves to the dashing figure riding off into the setting sun or racing across the goal line, ordinary men in everyday life cannot help but feel overshadowed. Even in private, men no longer feel like heroes’. Horrocks catalogues the costs of ‘patriarchal masculinity:

Patriarchal masculinity cripples men. Manhood as we know it in our society requires such a self-destructive identity, a deeply masochistic self-denial, a shrinkage of the self, a turning away from whole areas of life, the man who obeys the demands of masculinity has become only half-human... To become the man I was supposed to be, I had to destroy my most vulnerable side, my sensitivity, my femininity, my creativity, and I had to pretend to be both more powerful and less powerful than I feel (Horrocks 1994, p. 25; see also Levant 1997; Messner 1997, pp. 5–6).
Whatever the historical or comparative limits of these various definitions and depictions of masculinity, scholars argue that at any time, in any place, there is an identifiable ‘normative’ or ‘hegemonic’ masculinity that sets the standards for male demeanour, thinking and action (Bederman 1995; Connell 1995; Mosse 1996). Hegemonic masculinity is more than an ‘ideal’, it is assumptive, widely held, and has the quality of appearing to be ‘natural’ (Morgan 1992; Donaldson 1993). This is not to say there is consensus among all men and women in any national setting about the ideal man. Indeed, hegemonic masculinity often stands in contrast to other class-, race- and sexuality-based masculinities. None the less, hegemonic masculinity remains a standard — whether reviled or revered — against which other masculinities compete or define themselves.

Whether current US hegemonic masculinity is derived from a nineteenth-century renaissance of manliness and/or is rooted in earlier historical cultural conceptions of manhood, it is certainly identifiable as the dominant form among several racial, sexual and class-based masculinities in contemporary US society (see Kimmel 1995; Kimmel and Messner 1995; Pfeil 1995; Schwalbe 1995). The same can be said for other countries as well — in Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia or the Middle East. For instance, whether the manly attitudes and rules for behaviour for Arab men described by T. E. Lawrence in Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926) set the current standards of manliness for men in the modern Arab world is not so much the question, as whether some ... of masculinestandards exists and can be identified as hegemonic. The answer to that question is most certainly, yes.9

Nationalism

Max Weber defines a nation as ‘a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state’ and which holds notions of common descent, though not necessarily common blood (Gerth and Mills 1948, pp. 172–79). Layoun (1991, pp. 410–11) concurs: nationalism ‘constructs and proffers a narrative of the “nation” and of its relation to an already existing or potential state’. By these definitions nationalism is both a goal — to achieve statehood, and a belief — in collective commonality. Nationalists seek to accomplish both statehood and nationhood. The goal of sovereign statehood, ‘state-building’, often takes the form of revolutionary or anti-colonial warfare. The maintenance and exercise of statehood vis-à-vis other nation-states often takes the form of armed conflict. As a result, nationalism and militarism seem to go hand in hand.

The goal of nationhood, ‘nation-building’, involves ‘imagining’ a national past and present (Anderson 1991), inventing traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), and symbolically constructing community (Cohen 1985). As Gellner (1983, p. 49) argues, ‘it is nationalism that
engenders nations, and not the other way around’. The tasks of defining community, of setting boundaries and of articulating national character, history, and a vision for the future tend to emphasize both unity and ‘otherness’. The project of establishing national identity and cultural boundaries tends to foster nationalist ethnocentrism. As a result nationalism and chauvinism seem to go hand in hand. Chauvinistic nationalism is often confined to the ideational realm in the form of attitudes and beliefs about national superiority. During periods of nationalist conflict or expansion, however, such ethnocentrism becomes animated. The result in modern world history has been for nationalism to display an intolerant, sometimes murderous face. Nairn (1977) refers to the nation as ‘the modern Janus’ to contrast nationalism’s two sides: a regressive, jingoistic, militaristic ‘warfare state’ visage versus a progressive community-building ‘welfare state’ countenance: guns versus butter.10

The distinction between ideology and action characterizes most discussions on the definition and operation of nationalism. Nationalist ideology, that is, beliefs about the nation—who we are, what we represent—become the basis and justification for national actions, that is to say, activities of state- and nation-building, the fight for independence, the creation of a political and legal order, the exclusion or inclusion of various categories of members, the relations with other nations. Whether manifested in action or ideology, most scholars identify the nineteenth century as the origin of nationalism as a way of understanding and organizing local and global politics. Nairn (1977) argues that ‘nationalism in its most general sense is determined by certain features of the world political economy in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day’. These features include a ‘new and heightened significance accorded to factors of nationality, ethnic inheritance, customs, and speech’ and ‘the creation of a national market economy and a viable national bourgeois class’ (p. 333). Similarly, Seton-Watson (1977) identifies the late 1700s as the dividing line between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations in Europe, where the old nations, such as the English, Scots, Danes, French and Swedes, enjoyed relative autonomy, and the new nations, basically the rest of the world, mobilized in the form of national movements to achieve independence, either from monarchies or from colonialism, articulating a form of nationalism designed to ‘implant in [their constituents] a national consciousness and a desire for political action’ (p. 9).

**Masculinity and nationalism**

By definition, nationalism is political and closely linked to the state and its institutions. Like the military, most state institutions have been historically and remain dominated by men. It is therefore no surprise that
the culture and ideology of hegemonic masculinity go hand in hand with the culture and ideology of hegemonic nationalism. Masculinity and nationalism articulate well with one another, and the modern form of Western masculinity emerged at about the same time and place as modern nationalism. Mosse notes that nationalism ‘was a movement which began and evolved parallel to modern masculinity’ in the West about a century ago. He describes modern masculinity as a centerpiece of all varieties of nationalist movements:

The masculine stereotype was not bound to any one of the powerful political ideologies of the previous century. It supported not only conservative movements . . . but the workers’ movement as well; even Bolshevik man was said to be “firm as an oak.” Modern masculinity from the very first was co-opted by the new nationalist movements of the nineteenth century (Mosse 1996, p. 7).

Other political ideologies of that time, in particular colonialism and imperialism, also resonated with contemporary standards of masculinity (see MacKenzie 1987; Walvin 1987; Bologh 1990). Many scholars link the nineteenth-century renaissance in manliness in Europe to the institutions and ideology of empire (Hobsbawm 1990; Koven 1991; Sinha 1995). Springhall (1987) describes the middle-class English ideal of Christian manliness, ‘muscular Christianity’, with its emphasis on sport – the ‘cult of games’ in the public schools; he outlines how, through organizations such as the Boys’ Brigade these middle-class values were communicated to ‘less privileged, board-school-educated, working-class boys in the nation’s large urban centres’ (p. 52). Boys from both classes served throughout the Empire in British imperial armies.

In the United States, masculinity was tightly woven into two nationalist imperialist projects: manifest destiny, which justified and advocated westward expansion, and the Monroe Doctrine, which justified and extended the US sphere of influence to include the entire western hemisphere. There is no better known embodiment of this marriage of manhood and US imperialism than Theodore Roosevelt. Well-known to have been a sickly child and labelled a privileged dandy in his youth, Roosevelt was subjected to humiliating attacks on his manliness early in his political career. When, in 1882 at the age of twenty-three Theodore Roosevelt started out in politics as a New York state assemblyman,

Daily newspapers lampooned Roosevelt as the quintessence of effeminacy. They nicknamed him “weakling”, “Jane-Dandy”, “Punkin-Lilly”, and “the exquisite Mr. Roosevelt”. They ridiculed his high voice, tight pants, and fancy clothing. Several began referring to him by the name of the well-known homosexual, Oscar Wilde, and one actually alleged (in a less-than-veiled phallic allusion) that Roosevelt
was “given to sucking the knob of an ivory cane” (Bederman 1995, p. 170).

Roosevelt set out on a campaign to reinvent himself as a man’s man. Two symbolic themes formed the foundation of his self-reconstruction effort: his claimed connection to the American West and his assertion of an imperial America. His campaign was phenomenally successful, and within five years he was running for the mayor of New York as the ‘Cowboy of the Dakotas’, embraced by a press which now praised him for his ‘virile zest for fighting and his “blizzard-seasoned” constitution’ (Bederman 1995, p. 171). This remarkable transformation can be traced to his writings and to a real estate purchase. In 1883 Roosevelt visited the Badlands in South Dakota and purchased a cattle ranch (Morris 1979). Following the death of his wife in 1884, he temporarily withdrew from politics and retreated to the ranch, but not before he began his public metamorphosis from a ‘gilded youth’ to a ‘masculine cowboy’ by granting the following interview printed in the New York Tribune:

It would electrify some of my friends who have accused me of representing the kid-glove element in politics if they could see me galloping over the plains, day in and day out, clad in a buckskin shirt and leather charparajos, with a big sombrero on my head. For good healthy exercise I would strongly recommend some of our gilded youth go West and try a short course of riding bucking ponies, and assist at the branding of a lot of Texas steers (Bederman 1995, p. 175).

Roosevelt’s cowboy career lasted only six months, but his book Hunting Trips of a Ranchman published the next year, in 1885, followed by Ranch Life and the Hunting Trail (1888) and the 4-volume The Winning of the West (1889–1896), secured his public identity as a real man. Roosevelt continued to reinvigorate his manliness by other writings [The Strenuous Life (1902) and African Game Trails: An Account of the African Wanderings of an American Hunter Naturalist (1910)], and by his bellicose demand for and support of the Spanish-American War in which his ‘Rough Riders’ personified themes of the US frontier and US imperialism.

Hoganson (1995; 1996) describes the role of masculine imagery in the discourse surrounding one campaign in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War which began in 1898 when the US sank the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, and which lasted until 1902. Following the sinking of the Spanish fleet, Filipinos began a fight for national independence. This set off a debate in the US about what should be the US stance towards the former Spanish colony: should it be free or become a US colony? Theodore Roosevelt was a central actor in this debate, and his position was clearly in the imperial camp: ‘We of America . . . we, the
sons of a nation yet in the pride of its lusty youth... know its future is ours if we have the manhood to grasp it, and we enter the new century girding our loins for the contest before us’ (Hoganson 1996, p. 3). It was not only Roosevelt who cast the debate in gendered, as well as ageist, terms. Prominent anti-imperialist, Senator George F. Hoar, was referred to by an ally of Roosevelt as a ‘fossil’ and was encouraged to give up his place in the Senate to ‘a young man who is progressive and who lives in the present and not in the musty past’ (Hoganson 1996, p. 3). The ‘Philippine question’ became a contest of young men against ‘old women’ (although women did not have the vote at the time), and the discourse spread to the (male only) voting constituency:

What this country needs most at this time are patriotic Americans not a lot of old women and decrepit politicians in their dotage who pose as statesmen... the nation has outgrown you. Give yourself a rest in some old man’s home and give the nation a chance to grow (Hoganson 1996, p. 3).

Theodore Roosevelt’s speeches and writings, and those of many of his contemporaries, reflect a racialized, imperial masculinity, where adventurous, but civilized white men tame or defeat inferior savage men of colour, be they American Indians, Africans, Spaniards, or Filipinos. Whether conquering the US frontier or ‘protecting’ the western hemisphere from European colonialism, Roosevelt’s masculinity depended on a chauvinistic, militaristic nationalism. Given the close association between nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologies of masculinity, colonialism, imperialism, militarism and nationalism, given the fact that it was mainly men who adhered to and enacted them, and given the power of those movements and institutions in the making of the modern world, it is not surprising that masculinity and nationalism seem stamped from the same mould – a mould which has shaped important aspects of the structure and culture of the nations and states in the modern state system.

**Men’s and women’s places in the nation**

Nationalist politics is a major venue for ‘accomplishing’ masculinity (Connell 1987) for several reasons. First, as noted above, the national state is essentially a masculine institution. Feminist scholars point out its hierarchical authority structure, the male domination of decision-making positions, the male superordinate/female subordinate internal division of labour, and the male legal regulation of female rights, labour and sexuality (Franzway, Court and Connell 1989; Grant and Tancred 1992; Connell 1995).

Second, the culture of nationalism is constructed to emphasize and resonate with masculine cultural themes. Terms like honour, patriotism,
cowardice, bravery and duty are hard to distinguish as either nationalist or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness. My point here is that the ‘microculture’ of masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the demands of nationalism, particularly its militaristic side. When, over the years I have asked my undergraduate students to write down on a piece of paper their answer to the question: ‘What is the worst name you can be called?’ the gender difference in their responses is striking. The vast majority of women respond: ‘slut’ (or its equivalent, with ‘bitch’ a rather distant second); the vaster majority of men respond: ‘wimp’ or ‘coward’ or ‘pussy’. Only cowards shirk the call to duty; real men are not cowards.

Patriotism is a siren call that few men can resist, particularly in the midst of a political ‘crisis;’ and if they do, they risk the disdain or worse of their communities and families, sometimes including their mothers. Counter to the common stereotype of mothers attempting to hold back their sons as they march off to war, Boulding (1977, p. 167) reports that many mothers of conscientious objectors during World War II opposed their sons’ pacifism. The disdain of men for pacifists is considerably greater, as Karlen (1971) recounts in Sexuality and Homosexuality: ‘In 1968 pacifists set up coffee houses to spread their word near military bases. A Special Force NCO said to a Newsweek reporter, “We aren’t fighting and dying so these goddam pansies can sit around drinking coffee”’ (p. 508).

Fear of accusations of cowardice is not the only magnet that pulls men towards patriotism, nationalism, or militarism. There is also the masculine allure of adventure. Men’s accountings of their enlistment in wars often describe their anticipation and excitement, their sense of embarking on a great adventure, their desire not to be ‘left behind’ or ‘left out’ of the grand quest that the war represents.

I felt the thrill of it — even I, a hard-boiled soldier of fortune — a man who was not supposed to have the slightest trace of nerves. I felt my throat tighten and several times the scene of marching columns swam in oddly elliptical circles. By God, I was shedding tears (Adams 1990, p. vii; see also Green 1993).

Finally, women occupy a distinct, symbolic role in nationalist culture, discourse and collective action, a role that reflects a masculinist definition of femininity and of women’s proper place in the nation. Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) have identified five ways in which women have tended to participate in ethnic, national, and state processes and practices: (a) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (b) as reproducers of the [normative] boundaries of ethnic/national groups [by enacting proper feminine behaviour]; (c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its
culture; (d) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and (e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (pp. 7–8).

While some of these roles involve action, women participating in or even leading nationalist struggles, the list is short and the same names are heard again and again. As Horrocks (1992, p. 25) notes when discussing the male dominance in public life: ‘The exception – Margaret Thatcher – proves the rule’. Indeed, Jayawardena (1986) Walby (1989); Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989); Tohidi (1991); Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992), among others, note the pressure felt by women nationalists to remain in supportive, symbolic, often suppressed and traditional roles.

Faced with these constraints, sometimes women attempt to enact nationalism through traditional roles assigned to them by nationalists – by supporting their husbands, raising their (the nation’s) children and serving as symbols of national honour. In these cases women can exploit both nationalist and enemy or oppressor patriarchal views of women’s roles in order to aid in nationalist struggles. For instance, in situations of military occupation, male nationalists seen on the street alone or in groups are often targets of arrest or detention. Women are less likely to be seen as dangerous or ‘up to something’, and so can serve as escorts for men or messengers for men who are sequestered inside houses. Similarly, women are often more successful at recruiting support for nationalist efforts because they are seen as less threatening and militant (Edgerton 1987; Sayigh and Peteet 1987; Mukarker 1993). Edgerton (1987) describes Northern Irish Catholic women’s use of traditional female housekeeping roles as a warning system against British army raids; the practice was called ‘bin [trash can] lid bashing:

When troops entered an area, local women would begin banging their bin lids on the pavement; the noise would carry throughout the area and alert others to follow suit. . . At the sound of the bin lids, scores of women would emerge armed with dusters and mops for a hasty spring clean (p. 65).

In addition to these ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985; Hart 1991), women have also participated more directly in various nationalist movements and conflicts, involving themselves in cadres and military units (Jayawardena 1986; Nategh 1987; Sayigh and Peteet 1987; Helie-Lucas 1988; Urdang 1989). Despite their bravery, sometimes taking on traditional male military roles, and despite the centrality of their contribution to many nationalist struggles, it is often the case that feminist nationalists find themselves once again under the thumb of institutionalized patriarchy once national independence is won. A nationalist movement that encourages women’s participation in the name of national liberation often balks at feminist demands for gender equality.
Perhaps the most well-known case of a nationalist movement ‘turning’ on its female supporters is that of Algeria. In 1962 Algeria finally freed itself from French colonial rule. The struggle had been a long and bitter one, and the fight for Algerian independence had been notable for the involvement of Algerian women. Daniele Djamila Amrane-Minne, who interviewed women veterans of the Algerian liberation movement in *Des Femmes dans la Guerre d’Algerie*, reports that 11,000 women were active participants in the national resistance movement, and that 2,000 women were in the armed wing of the movement (Kutschera 1996, pp. 40–41). Despite this extensive involvement of women in a Muslim country’s military movement, once independence was won, Algerian women found themselves ‘back in the kitchen’ (Boulding 1977, p. 179), forced to trade their combat fatigues for Islamic dress and the veil (*hijab*).\(^{13}\)

Lest this discussion of Muslim nationalism lead the reader to see masculinity and nationalism as an organizing and hegemonic relationship only for Islamic societies, it is important to remember that religious nationalism, indeed all nationalism, tends to be conservative, and ‘conservative’ often means ‘patriarchal’ (Yuval-Davis 1981; Lievesley 1996; Waylen 1996). This is partly due to the tendency of nationalists to be ‘retraditionalisers’ (Nagel 1996, p. 193), and to embrace tradition as a legitimating basis for nation-building and cultural renewal. These traditions, real or invented, are often patriarchal and point out the tenacious and entrenched nature of masculine privilege and the tight connection between masculinity and nationalism.

**Feminine shame and masculine honour in the national family**

Many theorists of nationalism have noted the tendency of nationalists to liken the nation to a family (McClintock 1991; Skurski 1994); it is a male-headed household in which both men and women have ‘natural’ roles to play. While women may be subordinated politically in nationalist movements and politics, as we have seen asserted above, they occupy an important symbolic place as the mothers of the nation. As exalted ‘mothers in the fatherland’ (Koonz 1987), their purity must be impeccable, and so nationalists often have a special interest in the sexuality and sexual behaviour of their women. While traditionalist men may be defenders of the family and the nation, women are thought by traditionalists to embody family and national honour; women’s shame is the family’s shame, the nation’s shame, the man’s shame.\(^{14}\)

There is no clearer example of the politics of dress and demeanour than the politics of the veil in Islamic nationalism. Outside the home many Arab and Muslim women wear traditional dress, ranging from a modest covering of the arms and legs in Western-style dress to which a head scarf is sometimes added, to the Iranian chador, a body-length scarf or cape worn over street clothing, to the full facial and body covering of
Saudi women. Many of these women assert that such dress is their preferred choice. They argue that being veiled is liberating, since the veil shields them from the sexual gaze of men (Makhlof 1979, p. 86), and allows them to be a person, not a sex object— a status unavailable to Western women (see Tohidi 1991, pp. 255–58). Other veiled women have taken up the veil as a symbol of nationalism in anti-Western, anti-colonial, or anti-imperial rebellion against Western-allied regimes who outlawed the veil (for example, in Iran; see Nategh 1987). For other women, veiling is a means of signifying their discontent and protesting their loss of economic and social position as a result of urbanization and industrialization (MacLeod 1991). Finally, for other, often immigrant, Muslim women, the veil represents a barrier against assimilation (Pfeil 1994, pp. 214–17). Many veiled women, however, including many once in the second category, resent their lack of choice in wearing the veil, and bitterly complain that what was once an act of defiance against a corrupt government or occupier, is now used by their own men to control and oppress them. A number of the accounts in Augustin’s *Palestinian Women* (1993) express regret and outrage at enforced veiling:

The reason why most women here in Gaza put on the shawl is that they are forced to. It is becoming dangerous for women not to cover their hair when they leave home. Some Muslim fanatics have even threatened to throw chemicals at women not wearing a shawl. There are, of course, deeply religious women who wear a shawl out of commitment. Other women rationalize, and regard the shawl not as a part of fundamentalist Islam but as a symbolic sign of the struggle for liberation, the Intifada. And a lot of women are forced by their husbands to cover their heads (Berberi 1993, p. 53).

These women face a difficult choice in resisting enforced veiling. If they stand up for their rights as women, they appear to be disloyal to their community, traitors to the national cause. In situations where ethnic and national communities are under siege, many women are not willing to protest patriarchal impositions such as the veil, including these Palestinian women activists:

We can’t open up a second front now. Our battle is not with men. In the context of struggling against the occupation . . . we have to postpone questions of gender liberation till after liberation . . . When we have our own state, we will work on women’s issues (Augustin 1993, pp. 37–8).

Questions of women’s dress and demeanour are really questions of purity and, oddly, of male honour. Women’s sexuality often turns out to be a matter of prime national interest for at least two reasons. First,
women’s role in nationalism is most often that of a mother, the symbol of the national hearth and home. Yuval-Davis (1993, p. 627) reminds us, ‘In France, it was La Patrie, a figure of a woman giving birth which personified the revolution’. In their discussion of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, Gaitskell and Unterhalter (1989) argue that Afrikaner women appear regularly in the rhetoric and imagery of the Afrikaner ‘volk’ (people), and that ‘they have figured overwhelmingly as mothers’ (p. 60).

Second, women’s sexuality is of concern to nationalists, since women as wives and daughters are bearers of masculine honour. For instance, ethnographers report Afghani Muslim nationalists’ conception of resource control, particularly labour, land and women, is defined as a matter of honour; ‘purdah is a key element in the protection of the family’s pride and honour’ (Moghadam 1991b, p. 433). El-Solh and Mabro (1994, p. 8) further refine the connection between men’s and family honour and women’s sexual respectability as a situation where honour is men’s to gain and women’s to lose: ‘Honour is seen more as men’s responsibility and shame as women’s . . . honour is seen as actively achieved while shame is seen as passively defended’.

It is not only Third World men whose honour is tied to their women’s sexuality, respectability and shame. While female fecundity is valued in the mothers of the nation, unruly female sexuality threatens to discredit the nation. Mosse (1985) describes this duality in depiction of women in European nationalist history: on the one hand, ‘female embodiments of the nation stood for eternal forces . . . [and] suggested innocence and chastity’ (p. 98), and most of all respectability, but on the other hand, the right women needed to be sexually available to the right men: ‘the maiden with the shield, the spirit that awaits a masculine leader’ (p. 101) to facilitate ‘the enjoyment of peace achieved by male warriors’ (p. 98). These images of acceptable female sexuality stood in contrast to female ‘decadents’ (prostitutes or lesbians) who were seen as ‘unpatriotic, weakening the nation’ (Mosse 1985, p. 109) and dishonouring the nation’s men. Both willing and unwilling sexual encounters between national women and ‘alien’ men can create a crisis of honour and can precipitate vengeful violence. Saunders (1995) describes the outrage of Australian men (white and aborigine) about voluntary sexual liaisons between African American servicemen and Australian women during World War II, which escalated to such a high level of ‘racial and sexual hysteria’ that six black GIs were executed for allegedly raping two white nurses in New Guinea (p. 186).16

Sexualized and militarized nationalism

Concerns about the sexual purity and activities of women is not the only way that sexuality arises as an issue in masculinity and nationalism. Enloe (1990, p. 56) argues, ‘when a nationalist movement becomes militarized
male privilege in the community usually becomes more entrenched’. She is referring to the highly masculine nature of things military. The military, it turns out, is also highly sexual. I am referring here to several (masculine hetero)sexualized aspects of military institutions and activities.

First, there is the sexualized nature of warfare. Hartsock (1983, 1984) argues that all forms of political power, including military power, have an erotic component; she points particularly to a masculine eroticism embedded in notions of military strength and valour. Classical history is replete with references linking strength and valour on the battlefield with masculine sexual virility, hence Julius Caesar’s (1951) admonition to men to avoid sexual intercourse before a battle (or in more modern times before that social equivalent of war, sport) so as not to sap their strength. Mosse (1985, p. 34) discusses debates in Germany about masturbation and homosexuality as sexual practices that endangered national military strength, and describes war as an ‘invitation to manliness’.

A second way that military institutions and actions are sexualized centres on the depiction of the ‘enemy’ in conflicts. Accounts of many wars and nationalist conflicts include portrayals of enemy men either as sexual demons, bent on raping nationalist women, or as sexual eunuchs, incapable of manly virility. Bederman’s (1995) analysis of Theodore Roosevelt’s nationalist discourse provides examples of both. In African Game Trails, Roosevelt adopts a colonialist’s superior, indulgent attitude towards African men, whom he describes as ‘strong, patient, good-humored . . . with something childlike about them that makes one really fond of them . . . Of course, like all savages and most children, they have their limits’ (Bederman 1995, p. 210). Roosevelt’s assessment of Native Americans was less patronizingly benevolent, since Indians represented a military threat to the white man whom he saw as

not taking part in a war against a civilized foe; he was fighting in a contest where women and children suffered the fate of the strong men . . . His sweetheart or wife had been carried off, ravished, and was at the moment the slave and concubine of some dirty and brutal Indian warrior (Bederman 1995, p. 181).

Mosse (1985) describes portrayals of women on the battlefield as victims of sexual aggression or exploitation along the lines depicted above. He notes, however, that ‘women haunted soldiers’ dreams and fantasies’ (p. 127) in other roles as well, either as ‘objects of sexual desire or as pure, self-sacrificing Madonnas, in other words, the field prostitute or the battlefield nurse’ (p. 128). Enemy women are more uniformly characterized as sexually promiscuous and available: sluts, whores, or legitimate targets of rape. The accounts of virtually all wars contain references to and discussions of the rape, sexual enslavement, or sexual
exploitation of women by not only individual or small groups of men, but by army high commands and as part of state-run national policies (see Brownmiller 1975; Enloe 1990, 1993; Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992). As Theweleit (1987) summarizes: ‘Woman is an infinite untrodden territory of desire which at every stage of historical deterritorialization, men in search of material for utopias have inundated with their desires’ (p. 294).

A third sexualized aspect of militarized conflict is the use of the masculine imagery of rape, penetration and sexual conquest to depict military weaponry and offensives. A commonly reported phrase alleged to have been written on US missiles targeted on Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War was, ‘Bend over, Saddam’ (Cohn 1993, p. 236). There is a tendency in national defence discourse to personify and sexually characterize the actions of states and armies. Cohn (1993, p. 236) reports that one ‘well-known academic security adviser was quoted as saying that “under Jimmy Carter the United States is spreading its legs for the Soviet Union”’. She reports similar sexualized depictions by a US defence analyst of former West German politicians who were concerned about popular opposition to the deployment of nuclear Europmissiles in the 1980s: ‘Those Krauts are a bunch of limp-dicked wimps’ (Cohn 1993, p. 236). Such sexualized military discourse is very much from a heterosexual standpoint, as is clear when we consider the imagery of rape during the 1991 Gulf War: attacks that needed to be defended or retaliated against were cast as heterosexual rapes of women (‘the rape of Kuwait’); attacks that were offensive against the Iraqi enemy were phrased as homosexual rapes of men (‘bend over, Saddam’) (see also Cohn 1987; 1990).

**Conclusion: defending masculinity**

What does this exploration of masculinity and nationalism tell us? For one thing, understanding the extensive nature of the link between nationalism, patriotism, militarism, imperialism and masculinity helps to make sense of some puzzling items in the news. It has always seemed a mystery to me why the men in military and para-military institutions – men concerned with manly demeanour and strength of character – often seemed so agitated and afraid of the entry, first of blacks, then (still) of women, and now of homosexuals into military institutions and organizations. This unseemly, sometimes hysterical resistance to a diversity that clearly exists outside military boundaries makes more sense when it is understood that these men are not only defending tradition but are defending a particular racial, gendered and sexual conception of self: a white, male, heterosexual notion of masculine identity loaded with all the burdens and privileges that go along with hegemonic masculinity. Understanding that their reactions reflect not only a defence of male privilege,
but also a defence of male culture and identity, makes clearer that there are fundamental issues at stake here for men who are committed to these masculinist and nationalist institutions and lifeways.

Another puzzling issue which this study of masculinity and nationalism has illuminated for me is the question of why men go to war. In the early 1990s, US Public Television stations aired a series on the US Civil War. I listened, night after night, to the voices of men and women in both the North and the South, and their accounts of the dangers, horrors, longings, sadness, anger and despair arising from the bloodiest conflict in US history. Night after night I asked the same question — why did these men continue to fight?

I could understand the motivations of southern men — from their perspective they were defending a homeland and way of life. I understood the ‘principles’ on each side: states’ rights, union, abolition, and I understood the power of conscription and official coercion to enlist. Even given all of that, what I did not understand was why the northerners were fighting, indeed were volunteering to fight. For instance, there was at that time, in the mid-1800s, just as there is now, ample evidence that African Americans were not held close to the hearts of northern white men or women. And while there was an organized movement against slavery in the north, there is no reason to believe that this issue enjoyed wide and fervent enough support to generate such high levels of northern participation in the war.

I found the first clue to the solution to this puzzle not in scholarly research, but in my own family — in my husband’s disinterest in my wonderings. That rank after rank of northern male cannon fodder lined up to die in massive battles such as Gettysburg and Antietam did not seem problematic to him at all. That I found this so inexplicable and that he found it so dull, suggested that the answer lay in a domain that was likely to be very gendered as well as very assumptive. Now we both know the answer: masculinity and nationalism.

Certainly there are wars that men resist, and there are men who resist all wars. However, once a war is widely defined as a matter of ‘duty’, ‘honour’, ‘patriotism’, a defence of ‘freedom’ and ‘the American way of life’, etc., then resistance for many men (and women) becomes a matter of cowardice and dishonour. For men confronted with this unpalatable threat of public humiliation (why isn’t he at the front?), there are added some sweeteners: the allure of adventure, the promise of masculine camaraderie, the opportunity to test and prove oneself, the chance to participate in a historic, larger-than-life, generation-defining event. Given this stick and these carrots, for many men the attraction of war becomes as irresistible as it is deadly. My husband intuitively grasped this reality: I had to write this article to ‘get’ it.

This is not to say that all men or all women respond in the same way to ‘a call to arms’. As noted above, there are racial, class and sexuality
differences in men’s and women’s views of hegemonic masculinity and appeals made on that basis. Indeed, many women are patriotic, concerned about honour, mobilizable; many men are critical of hegemonic masculinity and nationalism, and not mobilizable. And there are historical moments when hegemony wavers: the widespread resistance to the war in Vietnam was one such moment. Further, masculinist and nationalist ideology can affect women as well as men. Take the epithet, ‘wimp’. I have argued above that this is among men’s most dreaded insults, but that for women this is either not on their list, or nowhere near the top of their list. Carol Cohn (1993) was called a wimp while participating in a RAND corporation war simulation. She reported being ‘stung’ by the name-calling despite the fact that she was ‘a woman and a feminist, not only contemptuous of the mentality that measures human beings by their degree of so-called wimpishness, but also someone for whom the term wimp does not have a deeply resonant personal meaning’ (p. 237). Cohn’s explanation for her reaction centres on the power of group membership and reality-defining social context. While she was a participant in the simulation, she became ‘a participant in a discourse, a shared set of words, concepts, symbols that constituted not only the linguistic possibilities available to us but also constituted me in that situation’ (pp. 237–8). In other words, Cohn became ‘masculinized.’

But why don’t women who participate in masculine organizations or situations ‘feminize’ those institutions and settings, rather than becoming, however momentarily, masculinized themselves? Do women who join the military become ‘men’? Or if enough women join the military, will they ‘feminize’ it? Is there a critical mass, a point at which women cease to become masculinized in masculine institutions and begin to transform the institutions according to the feminine interests and culture they bring with them to that setting? I wonder, is the gender make-up of governments why nationalism is more associated with preparing for and waging war than with building schools, museums, hospitals and health care systems, social security systems, public transportation, arts and entertainment complexes, nature preserves? While states concern themselves with these things, they never seem to become the ‘moral equivalent of war’.

The answer to this question of women becoming masculinized or masculine institutions becoming feminized is an important one for making sense of national and international politics. As women enter the political realm in greater numbers around the world, will we see a shifting of state agendas and a decoupling of nationalism from masculinity? Enloe (1990) is sceptical. She notes the limited change that has resulted from the many nationalist independence movements around the world, and observes that in many post World War II states it is ‘business as usual’ with indigenous masculinity replacing colonialist masculinity at the helms of states:
Given the scores of nationalist movements which have managed to topple empires and create new ones, it is surprising that the international political system hasn’t been more radically altered than it has. But a nationalist movement informed by masculinist pride and holding a patriarchal vision of the new nation-state is likely to produce just one more actor in the international arena. A dozen new patriarchal nation-states may make the international bargaining table a bit more crowded, but it won’t change the international game being played at that table (Enloe 1990, p. 64).

There is one final puzzle that this exploration of masculinity and nationalism has begun to solve for me, that is, the different way that I, as a woman, may be experiencing my citizenship compared to the citizenship experience of men. According to a Southern African Tswana proverb, ‘a woman has no tribe’ (Young 1993, p. 26). I wonder whether it might not also be true that a woman has no nation, or that for many women the nation does not ‘feel’ the same as it does to many men. We are not expected to defend our country, run our country, or represent our country. Of course, many women do these things, but our presence in the masculine institutions of state—the government and the military—seems unwelcome unless we occupy the familiar supporting roles: secretary, lover, wife. We are more adrift from the nation, less likely to be called to ‘important’ and recognized public duty, and our contributions more likely to be seen as ‘private’, as linked only to ‘women’s issues’, and as such, less valued and acknowledged. Given this difference in men’s and women’s connection and conception of the nation and the state, it is not surprising that there is a ‘gender gap’ dividing men and women on so many political issues. Thus, the intimate link between masculinity and nationalism, like all hegemonic structures, shapes not only the feelings and thinking of men, it has left its stamp on the hearts and minds of women as well.

Notes
1. The ‘first wave’ of feminism was the suffrage movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the ‘second wave’ began in the late 1960s; see Rupp and Taylor (1987).
3. Skocpol (1979); Skocpol’s most recent book, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992), reflects an expansion of her thinking to include women and gender as issues to be addressed in political sociology.

7. This renaissance is generally attributed to efforts to find new answers to questions about men’s roles in a rapidly changing industrial economy and the mobilization of women for entry into the economy and politics; see Mosse 1985, 1996; Carnes 1989; Rotundo 1993; Bederman 1995. Leverenz (1989) identifies the beginning of this shift in definitions of manliness, away from a preoccupation with self-restraint and gentlemanliness to a more modern emphasis on competitive individualism, a bit earlier—in the mid-1800s.

8. In her study of the reunification of the US North and South in the decades following the Civil War, Silber (1993) argues that there were distinct northern and southern notions of manhood prior to the war, and that they converged during the masculine renaissance of the late 1800s to create contemporary US normative masculinity. On the eve of the Civil War:

   Southern white men relied on a code which counseled both chivalry and violence, both deferential respect to white womanhood and the forceful passions and energies that shaped their social power. They were men who constantly had to demonstrate their superior strength and force to the surrounding community, whether through dueling, drinking, or gambling. Northern middle-class men, in contrast, lived...a “culture of dignity,” in which institutions figured more prominently than notions of honour and community. These men abhorred many of the vices of southern men and committed themselves to individual self-improvement, to economic responsibility, and most of all to self-control (Silber 1993, p. 8; see also Adams 1990, pp. 25–6).

   This gap in notions of manliness before and during the Civil War was in contrast to a more unified notion of manhood leading up to and culminating in the 1898 Spanish-American War. In that later conflict the combined participation of both northerners and southerners reaffirmed the latter as members of the ‘South’s return to the patriotic fold’ (Silber 1993, p. 195) and established a common sense of ‘manhood’ between the two groups of men which represented a blending of northern and southern manly ideals:

   The patriotic propaganda of the Spanish-American War rested on the foundation of the reunited, military patriotism of northerners and southerners, especially the white people of the two regions. Moreover, the new symbolism of reunion also rested on the turn-of-the-century images of invigorated masculinity (Silber 1993, p. 196).

Thus, the US marched into the twentieth century armed with a sense of both unified nationhood and unified manhood.


10. Hernes’s (1987) analysis of ‘Welfare State and Woman Power’ suggests these themes represent the feminine and masculine sides of national state politics.

11. Boulding argues that women play a clear role in preparing ‘children and men for lifelong combat, whether in the occupation sphere, the civic arena, or the military battle-field’ (1977, p. 167); see also Adams 1990, pp. 131–2 and Vickers 1993, pp. 43–5.

12. Women’s observations of men off to war are consistent with male accounts, as illustrated by Vera Brittain’s description of her son, Edward’s embarkation for World War I in Testament of Youth:

   He has departed, leaving home laughing, with a delighted sense that he is not to be one of those men who will be branded for life because they have not taken part in the greatest struggle of modern times (Adams 1990, p. 131).

For a discussion of adventure in paramilitary organizations, see Gibson 1994.

13. Algerian women have paid a high price for their resistance in recent years. Following the suspension of the results of the 1992 elections, whose outcome would have
installed a pro-Islamic government. Islamic militants have escalated their armed opposition, and women, particularly those who do not wear the hijab, have become targets of their violence:

Crimes against women included abduction, torture, rape, gang rape and killing, crimes which were common by mid-1995. Feminist, militants, female journalists and teachers are particularly targeted, some of them forced to lead a clandestine life, having to hide from the bullets of the killers and their knives by constantly changing addresses and covering their tracks’ (Mehdid 1996, pp. 93–94).

For new accounts of these attacks, see Youssef (1994) and Steinfels (1995). Despite these perils, Hasan (1994, p. xv) notes that women’s interests remain an issue in nationalist debates: ‘Forging community identities does not imply or guarantee that women will always identify themselves with or adhere to prevailing religious doctrines which legitimize their subordination’.

14. The seriousness of women’s capacity to shame men is reflected in the legal justification for a husband’s ‘honour killing’ of his wife in cases of alleged adultery in Brazil (Thomas 1992).

15. Enloe (1990, p. 60) argues that waiting is a dangerous strategy:

Every time women succumb to the pressures to hold their tongue about problems they are having with men in nationalist organizations, nationalism becomes that much more masculinized... Women who have called for more genuine equality between the sexes — in the [nationalist] movement, in the home — have been told that now is not the time, the nation is too fragile, the enemy is too near. Women must be patient, they must wait until the nationalist goal is achieved, then relations between women and men can be addressed. “Not now, later”, is the advice that rings in the ears of many nationalist women’ (Enloe 1990, p. 62).

Women who press their case face challenges to their loyalty, their sexuality, or to their ethnic or national authenticity: they are either ‘carrying water’ for colonial oppressors, or they are lesbians, or they are unduly influenced by Western feminism. Third World feminists are quite aware of these charges and share some concerns about the need for an indigenous feminist analysis and agenda; as Delia Aguilar, a Filipino nationalist feminist comments: ‘When feminist solidarity networks are today proposed and extended globally, without a firm sense of identity — national, racial and class — we are likely to yield to feminist models designed by and for white, middle-class women in the industrial West and uncritically adopt these as our own’ (Enloe 1990, p. 64); see also Jayawardena (1986, ‘Introduction’) for a discussion of Third World indigenous feminism.

16. Luszki (1991) documents the role of General Douglas MacArthur in the execution; white American men also ‘agreed that black men should be forbidden access to Anglo-Australian women’ (Saunders 1995, p. 187).

17. See Jones (1994, pp. 122ff) for a discussion of the coercion faced by war-wary men in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

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